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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

KERRY ROSS BOREN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 870480

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and counsel for defendant have filed separate
briefs on appeal to this Court.

In response, the State will

first address the issues raised by defense counsel and then the
issues raised by defendant.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's Motion to
Withdraw a Guilty Plea to Murder in the Second Degree, a firstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp.
1983), in the Third Judicial District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i)(Supp. 1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's

Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea finding that defendant did not
show "good cause" for withdrawal?

2.

Whether defendant is precluded from raising

collateral issues on appeal from a denial of his Motion to
Withdraw his Guilty Plea?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(Supp. 1988):
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no
contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has
made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements:
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982)i
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of
be withdrawn at any time prior
A plea of guilty or no contest
withdrawn only upon good cause
leave of court.

not guilty may
to conviction.
may be
shown and with

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Kerry Ross Boren, was charged with Murder in
the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
-2-

Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983).

Defendant pled guilty to

subparagraph (c) of Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree
felony, on April 16, 1984, in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge
presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Banks on May 17,

1984, to a term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 15, 1983, defendant called a 911 telephone
operator to report that his wife, Eliva Boren, was having
difficulty breathing (R. 12). Robert Staley, a Salt Lake City
detective, responded to the call and upon arriving at defendant's
residence discovered Eliva in a crouched position in the bedroom.
Id.

Multiple bruises covered her entire body and she appeared to

be dead. Id.
Medical examination of Eliva confirmed her death and
revealed that the cause of death was "blunt force trauma" and
could not have been self-inflicted. Iji. Medical examination also
concluded that the cause of death, a probable beating, occurred
on or before September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983, at least
two days prior to defendant's 911 call. Id.
Holly Bollschweile, age 26, and Karen Boren, age 9,
were residing at defendant's home at the time of the victim's
death. Ld.

Both of them stated that on or about September 13,

1983, defendant entered the victim's bedroom and locked the
bedroom door. id.
victim. ]jd.

They heard sounds of defendant beating the

They also stated that they had heard defendant

beating the victim on prior occasions. Id,

-3-

On September 19, 1983, defendant was arrested and
charged with subsections (a) and (b) of Murder in the Second
Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b)(Supp. 1983) (R. 11). The information
alleged that defendant "intentionally or knowingly caused the
death" of the victim, or in the alternative, that defendant
"intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed
an act clearly dangerous to human life and caused the death" of
the victim. Id.
At a preliminary hearing on January 6, 1984, the State
amended the Information to add subsection (c) of Second Degree
Murder alleging that defendant, "acting under circumstances
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another." (R. 4,
13) (See Addendum "A"; Amended Information).

Defendant waived a

formal reading of the Amended Information (R. 4). The State
presented five witnesses and introduced two exhibits into
evidence (R. 5-6). One of the exhibits introduced was a medical
report diagramming the injuries sustained by the victim (R. 4)
(See Addendum "B"; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2). The report
described the injuries as "many contusions about the face, chest
and [right] knee and leg." Ijd. Defendant was present during the
presentation of the State's case (R. 4). Based upon the evidence
adduced, Judge Robert C. Gibson bound defendant over to the
district court for trial (R. 4).
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on
January 13, 1984, and given a copy of the amended information

R. 14). He entered a plea of "not guilty" to the Murder charge.
Id.

Upon motion of defendant, the Court ordered a psychiatric

evaluation (R. 18).
On April 16, 1984, defendant entered a change of plea
to the Murder charge (R. 50). At the change of plea hearing, the
Amended Information was read to defendant and he entered a plea
of "guilty" to Second Degree Murder under subsection (c), the
depraved indifference subsection (R. 133, p. 5) (See Addendum
"C"; Plea Hearing Transcript).

Judge Jay E. Banks sentenced

defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah State
Prison (R. 69-70).

Defendant did not appeal his conviction and

sentence.
On July 28, 1987, more than three years after defendant
entered his guilty plea, defendant filed a pro se Motion to
Withdraw his Guilty Plea (R. 76-79).

After a hearing on October

28, 1987, where defendant and his former defense counsel
testified, Judge Frank G. Noel denied the motion (R. 104). Judge
Noel found that defendant knew he was pleading to Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, and did so knowingly and voluntarily
(R. 117). He further found that defense counsel explained to
defendant and defendant understood the definition of "depraved
indifference," the subsection of Second Degree Murder under which
defendant pled guilty (R. 115). Defendant now appeals the denial
of his motion.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing where
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defendant was present during the preliminary hearing, a copy of
the information was read to defendant, and defendant acknowledged
his willingness to enter a voluntary guilty plea both orally and
in writing by admitting the elements of the offense after
consulting with his attorney.

Furthermore, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant's alleged
misunderstanding of the elements of the offense charged; namely,
that he knew he was creating a grave risk of death to another.
The record as a whole clearly establishes that this element was
explained to defendant and that defendant understood the mens rea
for the offense charged.
The remaining issues raised by defendant are collateral
and beyond the proper scope of review for a Motion to Withdraw a
Guilty Plea.

A defendant should not be permitted to raise issues

unrelated to the validity of his guilty plea particularly where
defendant could and should have raised such issues on direct
appeal.

Thus, this Court should not consider the merits of

defendant's remaining claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant claims that Judge Frank Noel abused his
discretion in denying his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.
Since Points I, II, III, IV, V and VI of appellate counsel's
brief focuses on the same issue, the state addresses all of these
points in Point I of this brief in response.

Defendant claims that the record below establishes that his
guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because Judge Banks
failed to strictly adhere to the procedures for taking guilty
pleas outlined in Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. § 77-3511(e) (Supp. 1988), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Specifically, defendant claims that he was not informed of each
element of the offense charged and that the court did not
determine whether defendant understood the nature of the charges.
Defendant concludes that the trial court's alleged failure
renders his guilty plea invalid.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of
guilty may be withdrawn as follows:
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
A plea of guilty or not contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of court.
Id.

Accordingly, a criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty

plea as a matter of right, but only upon a showing of "good
cause."

State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963);

State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978).

Mere technical errors

in the acceptance of an otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty
plea do not automatically invalidate a guilty plea.

State v.

Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986). Rather a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's
discretion.

State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977);

State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976).

As in all

discretionary matters afforded the trial judge's perogatives as
well as his advantaged position, reviewing courts accord
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considerable latitude to the trial judge's discretion and will
not interfere "unless it plainly appears that there was abuse
thereof." Forsyth, 560 P.2d at 339 (footnote omitted).
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a
trial court to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative
showing in the record that it was made intelligently and
voluntarily.

In Boykin, the petitioner pled guilty to five

indictments charging common law robbery and was sentenced to
death.

The judge asked no questions of the defendant concerning

his plea, and the defendant did not address the court.

The high

court stated:
Several federal constitutional rights are
involved in a waiver that takes place when a
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal
trial. First, is the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the
States by reason of the Fourteenth. . . .
Second, is the right to trial by jury. . . .
Third, is the right to confront one's
accusers. . . . We cannot presume a waiver
of these three important federal rights from
a silent record.
Id. at 243 (citations and footnote omitted).

As a result of

Boykin, minimum requirements were established which a court must
meet when a defendant enters a guilty plea.
In two decisions subsequent to Boykin, the Court
further clarified the relationship between a knowingly and
voluntarily entered plea and the defendant's constitutional
rights.

In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Court, citing
Boykin, upheld guilty pleas as voluntarily and intelligently made
-Q-

without any indication that a strict recitation of the Boykin
trilogy of constitutional rights was required to be made at the
time of the acceptance of the pleas.

In clarifying Boykin, the

Court stated:
The new element added in Boykin was the
requirement that the record must
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who
pleaded guilty entered his plea
understandingly and voluntarily.
Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-48, fn. 4.

The Brady court looked to the

issue of voluntariness and intelligence of the person taking the
plea without tying its analysis to the strictures of the Boykin
litany.

The Court considered all relevant circumstances

surrounding the guilty plea in order to determine its
voluntariness.
Likewise, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), the determination of whether a plea was made voluntarily
and intelligently did not rest upon the structured questions of
the Boykin litany, but rather upon the determination of "whether
the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant."

Alford,

400 U.S. at 31.
In addition to the minimum requirements enumerated in
Boykin, criminal guilty pleas in Utah are governed by Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988), which
provides as follows:
(3) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no
contest and shall not accept such a pea until the court has
made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
-9-

waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements:
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
In conducting a Rule 11(e) review of this case, the less-rigid
2
Warner-Brooks standard should be applied.

Warner v. Morris, 709

P.2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).
See also State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986).

Under

Warner-Brooks, the "record as a whole" standard is applied by the
appellate court to determine whether the defendant entered his
plea with full knowledge and understanding of the offense of
which he had been charged, its elements, and the nature of the
sentence he may receive.
In Warner & Brooks, the trial court failed to ask
specifically if Mhe [defendant] was aware that he had a right
In the case at bar, defendant entered his guilty plea on
April 16, 1984. Because defendant's plea was entered prior to
this Court's 1987 decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987), this Court should find that Gibbons should not be
applied retroactively. See State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92
(Utah App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).

against compulsory self-incrimination" Warner/ 709 P.2d at 310.
Despite the trial court's failure to address the issue, this
Court stated "that the record as a whole affirmatively
established that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge
and understanding of its consequences." Id. at 310.
In Miller, the defendant argued the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea since he did not understand the nature of the charges
against him or the consequences of his plea.
405.

Miller, 718 P.2d at

This Court found that although the trial court did not make

a specific finding to this effect, "the absence of a finding
under this section is not critical so long as the record as a
whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his
plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights he was waiving." Id.
Miller, Warner and Brooks indicate that a trial court
accepting a guilty plea is not constitutionally required to do
all that Rule 11(e) lists.

Constitutionally, all that is

required is that the overall record discloses that the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea.
In addition, other courts have differed as to how
strictly the Boykin standard must be followed in guilty plea
proceedings.

A majority of courts have held that as a matter of

constitutional due process, a defendant's constitutional rights
to a jury trial, confrontation, and protection against selfincrimination need not be specifically and expressly articulated
by the trial judge and expressly waived by the accused prior to
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the acceptance of the guilty plea.

See e.g., Rouse v. Foster,

672 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Neely v. Duckworth, 473
F.Supp. 288 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761
(9th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th
Cir. 1973); McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1106-10 (5th
Cir. 1973) cert, denied 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Wood v. Morris, 87
Wash. 2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1976); State v. Laurino, 106
Ariz. 586, 480 P.2d 342, 344 (1971).
The constitutional requirements of Rule 11(e) and
Boykin were met in the instant case as shown by a review of the
record.

At the April 16, 1984, guilty plea hearing, Judge Banks

questioned defendant to determine whether defendant's guilty plea
was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (R. 133, P. 26) (Addendum "C"; Plea Hearing Transcript).
its inquiry by stating the crime charged:
Degree." Ki. at 2.

The court commenced
"Murder in the Second

Defense counsel added that defendant was

pleading guilty under subsection (c), the depraved indifference
subsection of Second Degree Murder, and not under either
subsection (a) or (b). Ix*-

Defense counsel explained that the

plea bargain agreement included the State's promise to not file
any charges concerning defendant's alleged sexual relations with
a child and also to request the Uintah County prosecutor to not
proceed on a car theft diversion case which diversion would be
violated by defendant's guilty plea. Id.
When defendant was questioned if there had been any
promises made to induce his guilty plea other than previously
stated in court, defendant answered in the negative. Ijd. at 2-3.

Defendant also denied the existence of any promises as to the
sentence which may be imposed by the court and denied any threat,
duress, or that any other undue influence was exerted on him to
enter a guilty plea. Icl. at 3.
Defendant, openly admitted the facts supporting the
charge. Jki. Specifically, defendant acknowledged that he
understood that he was admitting that his actions demonstrated a
"depraved indifference to human life." Ri.

He further

acknowledged that he was 42 years old and could read and write
the English language. Id.
The Court then asked defendant whether he was under the
influence of any drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic beverages or
whether he had any physical or mental disability that would
interfere with his ability to freely enter a guilty plea.
Defendant responded in the negative. Id.
The Court asked defendant if he had reviewed his
constitutional rights as set forth in the plea affidavit. (R. 5051, 133 at p.4). (See Addendum "D"; Plea Affidavit).

The plea

affidavit, signed by defendant, fully explains the underlying
facts of the charge, the elements and nature of the offense
charged, the maximum sentence which may be imposed, and the full
array of constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea
(R. 50-51).

Defendant indicated that he had reviewed his

constitutional rights and understood the rights he was waiving
(R. 133, p. 4). Defendant was afforded an opportunity to
question the court about the waiver of his constitutional rights,
which he declined Iji. Defendant expressly waived all of his

constitutional rights, both state and federal, and executed the
affidavit. Icl. He acknowledged to the Court that he understood
the sentence for the crime is five years to life in the Utah
State Prison and that in all probability he would be so
committed. Id.
The Court then asked defendant how he pled to criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony,
occurring at 34 East Miller Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on or about September 15, 1983, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953, as amended), in that defendant, while
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another and thereby caused the death of Eliva Boren. Id.
at 5.

Defendant responded "guilty." ^d.

The Court entered a

finding that defendant's guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily
made." Id. at 5.
Regardless of these facts, defendant asserts that his
guilty plea was improperly entered because neither the judge nor
the plea affidavit explicitly stated the appropriate mens rea for
the depraved indifference murder charge.

He claims that he did

not understand the nature and elements of the charge.
Recently, this Court in State v. Standiford, 98 Utah
Adv. Rep. 43 (Sup. Ct. December 30, 1988), clarified the culpable
mental state for depraved indifference murder under Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-203(1)(c)(Supp. 1988).3

Under Standiford, a "jury

Subsequent to defendant's guilty plea, the Second Degree
Murder statute was amended in 1986. 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 157, § 1.
However, the amendment is insignificant to the analysis of the

should be instructed that to convict of depraved murder it must
find (1) that the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a
grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew the risk of
death was grave, (4) which means a highly likely probability of
death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness
and indifference toward human life." Standiford at 48.
Defendant alleges a misunderstanding of the first two
elements of depraved indifference murder, i.e. that he acted
knowingly in creating a grave risk of death.

To commit depraved

murder, a defendant need not knowingly cause the death of
another, but "only consciously engage in such conduct, even
though not intending the resulting death."
P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 1986).

State v. Frame, 723

Thus, the knowing element for

depraved indifference murder is less than what is required for an
intentional or knowing murder.

Standiford at 48.

In the case at bar, defendant acknowledged consciously
engaging in conduct that created a grave risk of death to the
victim (R. 133, p. 3). He further acknowledged the facts
supporting the charge which alleged that the victim died as a
result of a severe beating (R. 133, p. 4; R. 12). After beating
his wife, defendant again knowingly engaged in conduct that
created a grave risk of death by failing to secure adequate
medical attention for her. Id.

The medical reports concluded

that the cause of death, a probable beating, occurred on or
between September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983. Ici. Two days

Cont.

present case.
-15-

later, on September 15, 1983, defendant called the 911 operator
and reported that his wife was having difficulty breathing. Id.
Moreover, defendant testified at the evidentiary
hearing below that his mental state at the time of his wife's
death was that he "was ignoring her, and her needs, and her
problems." (R. 134, p. 19). After severely beating his wife,
defendant admitted that he consciously ignored the medical needs
of his wife. Id.
The Plea Affidavit, signed by defendant, also
establishes that defendant understood he was admitting knowing
conduct in regards to his wife's death (R. 50; Addendum "D"; Plea
Affidavit).

The facts portion of the affidavit reads, "I created

a grave risk of death to my wife which resulted in her death by
my lack of appropriate treatment and care." jLd.

From this clear

language, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant understood
he knowingly engaged in conduct that resulted in his wife's
death.
The testimony of defendant's former defense counsel
also establishes that the defendant understood the knowing
element of the depraved indifference murder charge.

At the

evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that she conferred
with defendant personally before he entered his guilty plea (R.
134, p. 53, 64-65).

She testified that she explained to

defendant the definition of "depraved indifference" and what it
meant as opposed to intentionally and knowingly causing another's
death, ^d. at 58.

She also testified that she was satisfied that

defendant understood the difference between the two charges. Id.

Defendant adinitted that defense counsel had in fact explained and
defined depraved indifference murder to him prior to the plea.
Id. at 31.
Based upon this evidence, Judge Noel found that defense
counsel explained to defendant and defendant understood the
definition of "depraved indifference,M the subsection of Second
Degree Murder under which defendant pled guilty (R. 115 )(See
Addendum "E"; Findings and Conclusions).

He further found that

defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered (R. 117)
Addendum "E").
Overwhelmingly, the record as a whole establishes that
defendant clearly received "'real notice of the true nature of
the charge against him.'"

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645

(1976) quoting Smith v. 0'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
Furthermore, based upon the preliminary hearing evidence, the
plea affidavit, the plea hearing transcript, the testimony of
defense counsel, and the testimony of defendant, the record
clearly establishes that defendant understood "the elements of
the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts."
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).

Thus, Judge

Noel did not abuse his discretion in finding that defendant's
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES ON
APPEAL COLLATERAL TO HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant raises several claims in addition to his
attack on his guilty plea.

Specifically, appellate counsel

claims defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at
the plea hearing.

Additionally, defendant in his pro se

supplemental brief claims a Miranda violation during a pretrial
custodial interrogation and a denial of access to personally
review his pre-sentence report.

These claims are procedurally

barred.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) permits a criminal
defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea upon a showing of
"good cause."

The purpose is to permit a defendant to "undo a

plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily
made."

State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)

(footnote omitted.)

As noted by this Court in State v. Gibbons,

740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), there is no statutory time limit
for filing a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea.

However, the

limited statutory privilege to move to withdraw a guilty plea
does not include a right to raise issues collateral to the
withdrawal motion.
Similar to the reasoning in cases involving collateral
attack by habeas corpus, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should not be used to perform the same function as regular
appellate review. Cf.
(Utah 1983).

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104

If a motion to withdraw is denied by the trial

court, a "defendant could them appeal-not from the conviction per
se but from the denial of the motion."

Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d

341 (Utah App. 1988) citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1311-12 (Utah 1987).

The statutory privilege to appeal a denial

of a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea must be narrowly limited to

whether the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
general attack on a conviction should not be permitted.

A
Were it

otherwise, "the regular rules of appellate procedure governing
appeals and the limitations of time specified therein would be
rendered impotent."

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d

968; 969 (1968).
In the present case, defendant's ineffective
assistance, Miranda, and pre-sentence report claims could and
should have been raised on direct appeal

Accordingly, defendant

should be considered procedurally barred from raising collateral
issues in a postconviction Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. Cf.
Codianna, at 1104.
In any event, the Miranda and pre-sentence report
claims are not relevant to the validity of defendant's guilty
plea and should be considered beyond the scope of review.

While

the ineffective assistance claim may be argued to have some
relation to the validity of the plea, a full Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) reh'g denied 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)
analysis is unwarranted.

Rather, the focus must be on whether

defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
entered, not whether defendant's trial attorney was effective at
the plea hearing. Cf. Gallegos at 1041.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.
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J7^
DATED this f ('^

day of April, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Connie L. Mower, attorney for plaintiff, 255 East 400 South,
Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
1989.

April,
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ADDENDUM A

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Issued by: E. Neal Gunnarson
THE STATE OF UTAH
BAIL: $150,000.00
VS.
KERRY R. BOREN

08/03/41

Judge
AMENDED INFORMATION
Criminal No. 83 FS 2371

Defendant(s).
(Address/Dob)
S
The undersignedftofrortfc4ra-fr»y- South S.L.P.D.
under oath states on information and beliet that the defendant(s)
committee the crimes ot:

0

CRIMINAL HUM1CIDE, MURDER, SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree Felony,
at 34 East Miller Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State ot
Utah, on-or about September 15, 1983, m violation ot Title
76, Chapter b, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
y
amended, in that the defendant, KERRY R. BOREN, a party to
'
the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
^
Elvia boren, or intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life
that caused the death ot Elvia Boren, or acting under
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human
lite, engaged in conduct whicn created a grave risk of death
to another, and thereby caused the death of Elvia Boren;
*^t^C^**^^

This information is based
on evidence obtained trom
the following witnesses:

Subscribed and sworn to me
this £>> day of January

Authorized tor presentment and filing:
COUNTY ATTORNEY
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

ooool
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
STATE OF
BEFORE

COURT

COUNTY

UTAH

THE H O N O R A B L E

JAY E.

BANKS

--OO0OO-STATE OF

UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINT IFF,
VS .
KERRY

ROSS

BOREN,
DEFENDANT.

TRANSCRIPT

TAKE\ AT:

METROPOLITAN

OF

2tMED
CASE N O .

CR-8<4-^0

PROCEEDINGS

HALL OF J U S T I C E ; SALT LAKE CITY,

UTAH

APPEARANCES:
FOR

TrE STATE OF U T A H :

NEAL G U N N A R S O N
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

FOR

THE D E F E N D A N T :

M S . LINDA CARTER
LEGAL D E F E N D E R S 1

DATE:

APRIL

ASSOCIATION

16, 1 9 8 ^

R o b y n H a y ale
Haynlc & Solder

817 Lake Street
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84102
(801) 531-6116

•"•• I i
—

mr* r**^

V

MAY 4 1 9 8 8
'-*r\\ /" )j(
C'erti. Suprame O.jfl. i nvi

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1987

2

9:30 A.M.

3

--OO0OO--

4
5

THE COURT:

6I

MS. CARTER:

7

BEHALF.

KERRY ROSS BOREN.
LINDA CARTER APPEARING ON HIS

YOUR HONOR, THE PLEA BARGAIN THAT HAS BEEN

8 I ACCEPTED BY MR. BOREN IS HE WILL REENTER A PLEA AS CHARGED
9

IN THIS CASE, AND THE STATE HAS AGREED THAT THEY WILL NOT

10

FILE ANY CHARGES CONCERNING ALLEGED SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A

11

CHILD.

12
13

THE PROSECUTOR HAS ALSO AGREED THAT WE WILL
CALL THE PROSECUTOR IN UINTAH COUNTY AND ASK THEM NOT TO

14 I PROCEED ON A CAR THEFT DIVERSION CASE THERE WHERE THIS PLEA
15

WOULD CLEARLY VIOLATE THE DIVERSION, AND THAT'S THE EXTENT

16

OF THE PLEA BARGAIN.

17

MR. GUNNARSON:

18

THE COURT:

19

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

YOUR NAME IS KERRY R. BOREN, AND I

BELIEVE YOU ARE CHARGED WITH MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

20

MS. CARTER:

YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS I COULD HELP

21

THE COURT.

HE IS PLEADING UNDER THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE

22

SECTION AND NOT UNDER EITHER THE "A" OR "B" SUBSECTIONS.

23

THE COURT:

IS THAT AGREEABLE WITH THE STATE?

24

MR. GUNNARSON:

25

THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

OTHER THAN WHAT HAS BEEN STATED

1
1

HERE IN COURT, MR. BOREN, HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE

2

TO YOU TO INDUCE YOU TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY?

3

MR. BOREN:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

4

THE COURT:

HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS

5

OR ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO ENTER SUCH A

6

PLEA?

7

MR. BOREN:

NO, SIR.

8

THE COURT:

BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU

9

DO, IN FACT, ADMIT THE FACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE.

10

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

11

TO HUMAN LIFE.

DO

THAT MEANS THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE

12

MR. BOREN

YES, YOUR HONOR.

13

THE COURT

HOW OLD ARE YOU?

14

MR. BOREN

k2 .

15

THE COURT

DO YOU READ AND WRITE THE ENGLISH

17

MR. BOREN:

YES, SIR.

18

THE COURT:

ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE

16

19

LANGUAGE?

INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES?

20

MR. BOREN:

NO, SIR.

21

THE COURT:

DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE A MENTAL

22

OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH YOUR

23

FREE CHOICE TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY?

24

MR. BOREN:

NO, SIR.

25

THE COURT:

HAVE YOU GONE OVER THE AFFIDAVIT

1+

THAT SETS FORTH YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
MR. BOREN:

YES, I HAVE.

THE COURT:

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS?

MR. BOREN:

YES, I DO.

THE COURT:

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD

CARE TO ASK THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO THOSE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
MR. BOREN:

NO, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T.

THE COURT:

BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO

WAIVE ALL OF THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY
STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

THAT?
MR. BOREN:

YES, SIR.

THE COURT:

HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT.
(MR. BOREN EXECUTES THE
AFFIDAVIT.)

THE COURT:

THE SENTENCE FOR THIS CHARGE IS FIVE

YEARS TO LIFE IN THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY.

YOU UNDER-

STAND THAT?
MR. BOREN:

YES, I DO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO

YOU AS TO WHAT THE COURT MAY DO AS TO SENTENCE IN THIS CASE?
MR. BOREN:

NO, SIR, THERE HASN'T.

THE COURT:

I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN ALL

PROBABILITY YOU WILL BE COMMITTED TO THE STATE PENITENTIARY.

1

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

2

MR. BOREN:

YES, SIR.

3I

THE COURT:

THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A COMPELLING

4

REASON WHY I WOULD NOT COMMIT YOU TO THE STATE PENITENTIARY

5

UNDER SUCH A CHARGE.

6!

ASIDE.

7

HIS FORMER PLEA OF NOT GUILTY IS SET

MR. BOREN, TO THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE,

8 I MURDER IN THE SECOND-DEGREE, A FIRST-DEGREE FELONY, AS I
9

HAVE EXPLAINED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 3** EAST MILLER

10

AVENUE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT

11

SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 6,

12

SECTION 203, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT

13

YOU, KERRY R. BOREN -- WAIT A MINUTE.

14

H E AMENDED INFORMATION.

15

WHILE ACTING UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING A DEPRAVED

16

INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE -- ENGAGED IN CONDUCT WHICH

17

CREATED A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER AND THEREBY CAUSED

18

THE DEATH OF ELVIA BOREN.

I HAVE GOT TO GET

CAUSED THE DEATH OF ELVIA BOREN -•

19

WHAT NOW IS YOUR PLEA, GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY?

20

MR. BOREN:

GUILTY, YOUR HONOR.

21

THE COURT:

PLEA OF GUILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE

22

COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE

23

DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

24

ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A

25

PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH

6

I
1

HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA

2

I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE

3

DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS)

4I

THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO

5
6

YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS
THAN TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS.

7
8

MS. CARTER:

WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE?

WE WOULD ASK FOR A PRESENTENCE

REPORT, YOUR HONOR

9

THE COURT:

THE MATTER WILL BE REFERRED TO THE

10

ADULT PAROLE AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT FOR A PRESENTENCE

11

REPORT, AND MY CLERK WILL HAVE AN AGENT CONTACT YOU IN THE

12

JAIL.

13

HAVE YOU SPENT MOST OF YOUR LIFE HERE IN UTAH?

14 I

MR. BOREN:

YES, SIR.

15

THE COURT:

THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE IT DONE

16 I

BY THE UTH.

17

9:30 A.M

18|
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

SENTENCING WILL BE SET FOR MAY THE 4TH AT

MS.

CARTER:

THANK YOU,

YOUR HONOR

7

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I, ROBYN HAYNIE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FOREGOING PAGES 2 THROUGH 6, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A FULL,
TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE REQUESTED PORTION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS HAD UPON THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER ON APRIL 16, 198"+, AND THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL AND
RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND ALL MATTERS TO WHICH THE SAME
RELATE.
DATED THIS

\1**

DAY OF

C^r.^Wc-

ROBYN HAYNIE, tSR/RPR

1987.
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Court

. M b . Third

Jud.cl..

E>t..r)C.

State of U t a h

APR 16 1984

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

Ceputy Cie^k

ss
r.t . i j

i. .

/

Affidavit of Defendant

|

Criminal No. _»

P U I .. ii

__

Defendant
I.

M-rry

R.

Boron

, under oath, herebv acknowledge that I have entered a plea of

guilts to the charge(s) of

C r i m i n a l llQiu-Uli'j
(Name of Crime)
Hements

Facts.

Ac* ::,»; u : ; J e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
•r.cin*: a dcrraved

I created

indifference

,r.a:; life. LeferiJant
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death

to my wife

resulted
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'* ^ O * h »^ P

the d e a t h

l^J

X
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f p p q ^

a grave

H
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which

In h e r death
^L±

J

t

t

'.o-j
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* ^ ^ *

' •j -
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r> ^ ^» c

of a n o t h e r .

I have received a cops of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilts to is a

First

I/er;r*rek r v l o n y

( Degree of Felonv or Class of Misdemeanor)
i

and jnJcr^iand the punishment for this crime mav be
A -i

pr^on term.

v x Xj

> ° u KJ

* t>

fine, or both I am not on drugs or alcohol

Mv pica ot guilts ib treels and voluntanls made I am represented b> Attorney

i- m ^ a

n.

-^ \ ' : r

who has explained mv rights to me and I understand them
1 I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guiltv and to have a jur> trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilts, or to \ trial by a judge should I desire
2 I know that if I wish to have a trtal I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in mv
presence and before the Judge and lurv *ith the right to have those witnessescrossexamined bv mv attornev I aKo
know that I have a right to have mv witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to tesutv in court upon mv bchalt and
that I could testifv on mv own behalf, and that if I choose not todo so. thejurs will be told that this mav not be held
against me
^ I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and everv element ol the crime charged
bevond a reasonable doubt, that anv verdict rendered b> a jurv whether it be that ol guilts or not guiltv must be bv a
complete agreement ot all jurors
4 I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against mv self and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed an> crime and cannot be compelled to testifv unless I choose
to do so
3 I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or bv the Judge that 1
would have a right to appeal mv conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review ol the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid bv the
State without cost to me
6 I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting i am guilty ol the crime to which my plea of guiltv is entered
7 I also know that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have|\<f^Aj^
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentencwMng

*
I k n o w t h a i IK« feet i h « l I H«v« • ntervtf m * * • • offf^ltty do«« no* mrnmw* t h a i i h t Judge w.U oot imp«>»e e t t**«r a f,o«or sentence of i m p r i s o n m e n t u p o n me mn<i no p r o m i M i have been m a d e to me by a n y o n e a& to w h a t the sentence w i l l

he
9 No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty The following other charges
pending against me. to-wit (Court case number(s) or count(s))

The State will not file any charges arising; from alleged sex'ijl
relations with a chili.
will he dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will he filed against me for other crimes I ma> have committed which
are nou known to the prosecuting attorney I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought bv either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved bv
the Judge
lo

I have read this Affidavit or I have had it read tomebv m> attorney, and I know and understand its contents I

am — j ± 2

\ears ol age. have attended school through the

~^H-v^ C ^ A f J ^ c

understand the English language

HatcJ it-is

j

~

7

C

^

and I can read and

* $

dav of

. 19

9V

i?~i (K </< l*->Detcndant
Subscribed ana suorn to before me in Court this

dav of

19.

Vt

.„ / * Judge
( t R T I H C ATE OF D E F E N S E

ATTORNEY:

I -.crt.!'. that I am tne attornev for £^\
py
. the delendani named above and I know he
-*¥**Ur.js read the Attidavu. or that I have read it to him. and I discussed it with him and believe he lulls understands the
meaning ol its contents and is mentailv and phvsicaliv competent Tothe best of mv knowledgeand belief the statements,
representations and declarations made b> the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true

/

-A

\

{'
Dclense Attornev

( t R T ! H ( ATE OF PROSECTTINC ATTORNEV:
K e r r v R.
5' ,,an
defendant
I wertitv that I am the attornev tor the State of I'tah in its case against
I i;,r.c reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate No improper
•;iducemenis. threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant

There is reasonable cause to

K-iieve the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance ol the plea
would \er\e the punlic interest

/

/

/

Prosecuting Attornev

Based upon the facts set lorth in the loregomg Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the detendants plea ol
p n l u »s treelv and voluntanK made and it is ordered that defendants plea of "Guilty" to (he charge, set lorth in the
\ i h d d v n he accepted and entered
—T
Done m C ourt this

/(s

dav of

- ' J \

ATTEST

i_S

" ~

r / l l

^ r » , f ,

^

^ ^

H. DIXON HINDLEY
«..

. 19

,

/ ' •

*/ A-^
District Judge
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Telephone:
(801) 363-7900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
Plaintiff,
)

v.

Case No. CR 84-40
)

KERRY ROSS BOREN,
)

Honorable FRANK

G. NOEL

Defendant.
The
Honorable
of

Salt

198 7

above

Frank
Lake

entitled

Noel,

County,

to consider

After

having

prior

proceedings

the

received

matter

Judge
State

in

the Third

of

Utah,

Defendant's
testimony

concerning

came

on

the

Judicial
the

Motion
and

regularly

District

28th

day

to Withdraw

reviewing

initial

the

entry

before

of

of

the
Court

October,

Guilty

Plea.

transcripts
plea

by

of
the

Defendant, the court hereby enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
Murder
April

in

The
the

Defendant

Second

entered

Degree,

his

before

guilty

the

plea

Honorable

to
Jay

Homicide,
Banks

on

16, 1984.

oooil*

F I N D I N G S OF F A C T A N D
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW
Case No, CR 8 4 - 4 0
Page 2

2.

That

personally

explained

That

to

waive

Defendant

by entry

That

subsection

5.

plea

Ms.

of

plead

contents

entry

and

affidavit
Judge Jay

plea

the

Defendant

all

of

plea

Carter.

Ms.

constitutional

Carter

rights

adequately

the

Defendant

guilty.

explained

definition
in

conferred

the

to

of

the

Defendant

"depraved

Second

Degree

and

the

indifference",
under

which

the

guilty.

the

Ms.

Carter

affidavit

further

and

entry

Carter

Murder

That

of

to

the

of

c o u n s e l , M s . Linda

of plea of

understood

Defendant

of

prior

the D e f e n d a n t

4.

the

to

w i t h his d e f e n s e

3.

would

prior

the

explained

signed

by

Defendant

voluntarily

signed

the

to

the

Defendant

understood
the

Defendant

same

the

prior
contents

before

to
of

the
entry
said

the

Honorable

Defendant

indicated

Banks.

6.
the c h a r g e

That

the

to w h i c h

affidavit

signed

the D e f e n d a n t

by

the

was p l e a d i n g

guilty

was

Criminal

Homic ide.

7.

That

constitute Murder

the

elements

in the S e c o n d

outlined

Degree.

in

the

Affidavit

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. CR 84-40
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8.
admitted

the

That

at

acts

this

time

alleged

in

at

time

the

the

Defendant

affidavit

admits

under

that

Elements

he
and

Facts.

9.
informed

That

the

the court while

would be "as charged

10.

That

of

entry

of

plea,

Ms.

Carter

in the Defendant's presence that the plea

in this case", Murder in the Second Degree.

the following

statement was made by Judge Banks

during the Defendant's plea of guilty:

Mr. Boren, to the charge of Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony,
as I have explained it to you, which occurred at 34
East Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on or about September 15, 1983, in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that you, Kerry R.
Boren - - wait a minute.
I have got to get the
Amended
Information.
Caused
the death of Elvia
Boren
while
acting
under
circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life - engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another and thereby caused the death of
Elvia Boren.

That
picked

while

asking

up the Amended

the

Defendant

his

plea,

Judge

Information from which he continued

this did not negate the initial part of the above quoted
which

indicated

Defendant

the

statutory

provision

of the crime

Banks

to read;
paragraph

to which

the

plead.

<>l\Ol^

Case No. CR 84 au
Page 4

11.
36,

xapmy^imm

That

P2d

the requirements

of State

v. Gibbons, 60 UAR

(June 30, 1987) were fully complied with.

12.

That the Defendant knew he was pleading to Homicide,

Murder in the Second Degree and did so knowingly and voluntarily.

From the above Findings of Fact, the court now enters the
fo 1 lowi ng:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

After

constitutional
charges
knowingly

rights

against
entered

being

fully

and after

him, the

informed
being

Defendant

his plea of guilty

of

fully
freely,

all

informed

of

of the

voluntarily

to Homicide, Murder

his

and

in the

Second Degree.

2.

That

all requirements

of State

v. Gibbons, 60 UAR

36,
Defendant e n t e r e d hi
FRANK G.

NOEL,

JUDGE

Wheref ore/ # TttJ&CB£T enc * ant f s motion to withdraw £ i s
plea i s denied.

C*rfc

l*p*y Cm* III ,^sJ/,///
Approved as to form:

guilty

I^7

?\ I \0 i > '

__r.i_ ±
~RANDALL GAIT&friU/befense Counsel

ooovi8

